The More the Better? Effects of Training and Information Amount in Legal Judgments by Stephan Dickert et al.
MAX PLANCK SOCIETY
Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2010/34
The More the Better?
Effects of Training and Information 





Roman PortackPreprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods  Bonn 2010/34
The More the Better?
Effects of Training and Information Amount in Legal Judgments
Stephan Dickert, Britta Herbig, Andreas Glöckner,
Christina Gansen & Roman Portack
August 2010
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn 
http://www.coll.mpg.de1 
The More the Better?  












In an experimental study we investigated effects of information amount and legal training on 
the judgment accuracy in legal cases. In a two (legal training: yes vs. no) x two (information 
amount: high vs. low) between-subjects design, 90 participants judged the premeditation of a 
perpetrator in eight real-world cases decided by the German Federal Court of Justice. Judg-
ment accuracy was assessed in comparison with the Court’s ruling. Legal training increased 
judgment accuracy, but did not depend on the amount of information given. Furthermore, 
legal training corresponded with higher confidence. Interestingly, emotional reactions to the 
legal cases were stronger when more information was given for individuals without legal 
training but decreased for individuals with training. This interaction seems to be caused by 
fundamental differences in the way people construct their mental representations of the cases. 
We advance an information processing perspective to explain the observed differences in  
legal judgments and conclude with a discussion on the merits and problems of offering more 
information to lay people participating in legal decision making. 
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Introduction 
A fundamental task for legal decision makers (e.g., jurors or judges) is to make just and co-
herent judgments. In making these judgments, usually an abundance of information about the 
specifics of the case at hand has to be processed. It is commonly agreed upon that the under-
lying information processing of legal judgments should be unbiased and not influenced by 
factors that are exogenous and unrelated to the judgment task. However, there is a large liter-
ature indicating irrational influences. It has been shown, for example, that legal judgments 
depend on whether they are made in foresight or with knowledge of what happened in hind-
sight (Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999), that information is reevaluated in the decision pro-
cess to fit better with the preferred verdict (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Simon, 2004; Simon, 
Snow, & Read, 2004), that irrelevant information changes the degree of penalty (Englich, 
2005; Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006), and that mood has an influence on the verdict 
(Englich & Soder, 2009). These biases have been demonstrated for people with and without 
legal training (e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2007), and judges with legal training 
showed a smaller magnitude for only a few of them (see Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 
2000). While the impact of these biases may be slightly reduced by legal training, their influ-
ence on untrained individuals participating in legal court proceedings (i.e., jurors) might be 
particularly disconcerting given the prominent role ascribed to these individuals. Untrained 
legal decision makers are used in various functions in different legal systems (Ma, 1998). For 
example, in the US jurors fulfill the role of a community member judging the guilt of the de-
fendant who is charged with a crime she (possibly) committed in that community. In the 
German legal system, lay judges are used in order to judge legal cases together with trained 
professionals (i.e., professional judges) in some legal courts (Machura, 2001, 2007). In both 
of these examples, lay judges are given little or no training in legal discourse but are tasked 
with judging the guilt of a defendant. More often than not, these judgments rest on how judg-
es process the relatively complex material presented during the trial. 
The different approaches of trained vs. untrained legal decision makers could, however, be a 
cause for concern and encourage a closer look at how training influences information pro-
cessing and judgments in court. According to approaches explaining the development of ex-
pertise (see Holyoak, 1991, for an overview), legal training and experience influence the pro-
cessing of information in complex ways (Blasi, 1995; Marchant & Robinson, 1999; 
Spellman, 2010) resulting in improved judgment quality (but see also below). It has been 
shown that with intense training people develop complex knowledge structures that help them 
process large amounts of information (Chase & Simon, 1973). A common assumption for 
decision making has been that deliberative information processing together with more com-
plete information leads to better decisions (e.g., Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). This 
should especially be the case in the legal realm, where we would hope that having all infor-
mation available produces the fairest result of a trial. However, it is unclear whether more 
information leads to better legal decisions for untrained people, as they might not be able to 3 
process the information due to limited cognitive capacity and the fact that they lack specific 
knowledge structures that help them handle the increased amount of information. Moreover, 
due to their limited knowledge about legal decision making, untrained persons might be more 
susceptible to dilution effects (i.e., impact of diagnostic information on judgments and deci-
sion making is reduced when additional, non-diagnostic information is presented; cf. Nisbett, 
Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; Zukier, 1982). Persons with legal training should be better equipped 
to sort between legally relevant and irrelevant information. 
Differences in the mental processes underlying judgments of trained vs. untrained legal deci-
sion makers likely rest on the different knowledge structures they can draw upon when con-
sidering the legal information presented. Whereas untrained judges often have to rely on their 
general knowledge to weigh evidence and decide whether a defendant is guilty of breaking 
the law, trained judges are expected to consult their complex theoretical knowledge and an 
abundance of practical experience (Blasi, 1995; Klein, 1993; Spellman, 2010; see also 
Kahneman & Klein, 2009). This expertise and the level of training is commonly thought to 
influence decision quality and judgment accuracy (e.g., correct appraisal of the evidence and 
appropriate confidence in their judgments) by helping trained legal professionals to process 
complex legal information more effectively. Research on expertise and decision making has 
shown that experts exhibit high, outstanding, and exceptional performance which is domain-
specific, stable over time, and related to knowledge, experience and practice (cf. Sonnentag, 
2000). However, the influence of legal training or legal expertise has been investigated only 
sporadically in expertise research (e.g., Marchant, Robinson, Anderson, & Schadewald, 1991, 
1993; Nievelstein, van Gog, Boshuizen, & Prins, 2010). Nievelstein et al. (2010) showed that 
conceptual knowledge acquired by training is essential for solving legal cases, and also for 
efficiently using additional materials (e.g., lawbooks). Decision processes of legally trained 
vs. untrained persons in a domain with high density, relevance and public visibility of deci-
sions need careful study to better understand the underlying mechanisms and mental repre-
sentations leading to accurate judgments. Besides superior knowledge, factors that might dif-
fer for trained and untrained people making legal judgments are the ability to handle more 
and more complex information, the mental representation of legal information, confidence in 
one’s own judgments, and emotional reactions to the content of the legal scenarios.  
Training in a specific domain typically leads to more efficient information processing and to 
better judgments (e.g., Reyna & Lloyd, 2006; Ste-Marie, 1999). Training in legal decision 
making should therefore result in better selection and weighting of the available information. 
This efficiency should lead individuals with legal training to be able to handle more (and 
more complex) information better than individuals without legal training. Complexity can be 
defined as tasks, situations etc. that contain a high amount of information with manifold inter-
relations between them (e.g., Dörner & Schaub, 1994). Legal decision making is in most 
parts a highly complex task: For example, a judge not only has to consider information from 
a case, but also the laws and the interdependency between both (e.g., whether certain laws are 4 
applicable in a certain case or not). Research has shown that experts usually fare better in 
adapting to and dealing with complexity than novices (e.g., Haerem & Rau, 2007). Their 
knowledge is more complete, contains less incorrect parts, and is better integrated (e.g., 
Büssing & Herbig, 2003; Sonnentag, 2000).  
A direct consequence of the differences in knowledge and information search of people with 
and without domain specific training is a difference in the way complex tasks are mentally 
represented – both structurally and in terms of content. It is, for example, reasonable to as-
sume that people without legal training do not represent a crime in terms of legal categoriza-
tions while people with legal training could be expected to do just that. Moreover, concepts 
like encapsulated knowledge (e.g., Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992) or chunking (e.g., Lesgold, 
Rubinson, Feltovich, Glaser, Klopfer, & Wang, 1988) refer to structural dissimilarities de-
pending on expertise; that is, people with training and experience being able to store large 
quantities of information as one chunk but having access to all information if the necessity 
for a more detailed mental representation arises. Moreover, mental representations should 
mirror the differences between trained and untrained individuals in perceiving complexity 
(Haerem & Rau, 2007) and give rise to judgment confidence and emotional responses to the 
information.  
The confidence in a legal judgment is an important part in good legal decision making as it 
serves as an internal check for the quality in the judgment. When confidence is low, addition-
al information might be sought or the presented information weighted in a different way to 
produce greater confidence in one’s judgment (cf. Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). When infor-
mation is processed in a way that establishes a coherent mental representation of the legal 
material (e.g., a clear mental image of the sequence of events in a crime), confidence is usual-
ly higher (Holyoak & Simon, 1999). Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) showed that people – 
and especially experts – tend to be overconfident in their judgments in probability tasks (also 
Goodman-Delahunty, Granhag, Hartwig, & Loftus, 2010, for legal case predictions). It has 
been demonstrated that overconfidence is one of the downsides of bi-directional reasoning 
and story-construction processes that are used for solving legal cases (e.g., Holyoak & Si-
mon, 1999; Simon, 2004; Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997, see also Pennington & Hastie, 
1986, 1988, 1992). That is, in striving for coherence in the mental representation (or mental 
model) of the case, the validity of initial information changes in the direction of the emergent 
interpretation, which in turn leads to higher confidence in the judgment.  “[T]he greater the 
transformations of the mental models, the higher the confidence experienced” (Simon, 2004, 
p. 533). Greater knowledge in a specific domain and a more coherent mental model could 
therefore result in greater confidence.  
Emotional responses to a case also depend on the underlying information processes and the 
mental representation of the case (e.g., Ask & Granhag, 2007). It is not uncommon that the 
content of criminal cases evokes strong emotional reactions as violations of laws are often 
also violations against social or moral norms, which have the potential to evoke strong emo-5 
tional reactions (e.g., anger, disgust, etc.). Moreover, laws accommodate for emotions to be 
causally related to criminal actions (e.g., crimes of passion are treated differently than cold-
blooded crimes). The link between emotional responses to criminal behavior and legal judg-
ments is therefore not new, but has been an integral part of jurisdiction (Feigenson & Park, 
2006). It is of note that emotional responses of judges to legal material are generally seen as a 
source of bias that degrade judgment quality. This may stem from the common belief that 
legal decision making should be rule-based and built on careful deliberative analysis void of 
emotion However , the biasing function of emotions may depend on the level of legal training 
(Englich & Soder, 2009; Wessel, Drevland, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2006). If legal training 
leads to better calibrated mental representations and information processing, then we would 
expect individuals with such training to neglect biasing emotional responses or even to be 
able to build mental representations of the task that are based on abstract categories that do 
not evoke emotional responses at all. 
Research on judgment and decision making provides plenty of evidence that emotions (Be-
chara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; 
Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999, 2001; Naqvi, Shiv, & Be-
chara, 2006) and the amount of information to process (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van 
Baaren, 2006; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992) strongly influence decision processes (e.g., 
Feigenson & Park, 2006). Contrary to the assumption that emotions degrade decision perfor-
mance, research has also shown the merits of emotions in good decision making (e.g., Dickert 
& Peters, under review; Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2002). In legal scenarios, this might depend in large part on the type of emotion-
al response and its match with the legal standard. For example, a particularly heinous crime 
might evoke negative emotions that are actually in accord with ruling against the defendant. 
The interesting question is whether individuals trained (vs. untrained) in legal studies develop 
different emotional responses or whether they screen the information without reacting affec-
tively.  
In the present experiment we used legal cases recently decided by the German Federal Court 
of Justice to investigate the effects of amount of case-information (as one part of complexity) 
and legal training on the quality of legal judgments, confidence in the accuracy of those 
judgments, and emotional responses to the case material. Specifically, we manipulated the 
amount of information that people with and without legal training had to process by giving 
additional information about the legal case in question. Using cases already decided by the 
German Federal Court of Justice provided us with an outside criterion for judgment accuracy.  6 
Hypotheses  
Judgment accuracy 
We expected that the accuracy of legal judgments depends on legal experience, such that in-
dividuals with advanced legal training would outperform those without training (H1a). 
Providing more information should make it more difficult to focus on the relevant parts, re-
sulting in degraded judgment accuracy (H1b). However, the negative effect of information 
amount likely depends on legal training, such that individuals with legal training should be 
better able to deal with a higher amount of information than individuals without training 
(H1c). 
Confidence 
We hypothesized that individuals with legal training would be more confident in their judg-
ments (H2a). Consistent with hypothesis H1c, we also predict that for individuals with legal 
training more information would lead to higher confidence whereas the opposite effect would 
be observed for individuals without legal training (H2b). 
Emotions 
We expected that individuals with legal training process and integrate information in catego-
ries that accord with their existing legal knowledge, resulting in less emotional reactions 
(H3a). Additionally, we expected legal cases with more information to lead to more vivid 
mental representations of the crimes and thereby increasing emotional reactions (H3b). How-
ever, this effect might be particularly driven by individuals without legal training (H3c).  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Ninety students from the University of Bonn participated in this study which was part of a 2 
hour experimental battery with other studies on unrelated topics. The sample consisted of 49 
male and 41 female participants, with ages ranging from 19 to 53 (M = 24.1, SD = 4.48). Fif-
ty were law students with advanced legal training (5th to 12th semester) with the majority 
being shortly before the final bar exams (67% 7th semester and higher) and the other 40 par-
ticipants were students of other subjects in various stages of their studies. The sample of ad-
vanced law students consisted of 19 females and 31 males, ranging from 22 to 30 years  
(M =23.8, SD = 1.39) in age; the lay sample comprised 22 females and 18 males, with ages 
ranging from 19 to 53 years (M = 24.4, SD = 6.5). A manipulation check of self-rated experi-7 
ence with legal topics in general (1 = no experience at all, 5 = expert; Mtrained = 3.5; SDtrained = 
.51; Muntrained =1.7; SDuntrained = .51), criminal law (Mtrained = 3.2; SDtrained = .63; Muntrained =1.6; 
SDuntrained = .60) and theories of premeditation (Mtrained = 2.8; SDtrained = .79; Muntrained =1.5; 
SDuntrained = .60) supported their assignment to the subsamples (all differences t > 8.0, p < 
.001). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two information amount conditions 
(see below). Thus, we used a 2 (advanced legal training: yes vs. no) × 2 (information amount: 
high vs. low) between-subject design. 
Case material 
Cases were selected from the domain of criminal law, specifically cases of manslaughter with 
the crucial question of premeditation
7. Real cases documented in legal data bases were re-
searched and selected based on three criteria: First, verdicts of the German Federal Court of 
Justice regarding the case had to be available (see below). Second, cases had to be recent 
enough to prevent that participants with advanced legal training might recognize them from 
their studies. And third, cases should not be too complex in order to allow a case summary of 
about half a page without loosing critical information. From the available material eight cases 
were chosen (see appendix for a detailed example): A landlord causing a gas explosion and 
killing tenants, a deadly fight after a visit to the pub, a robbery at a newsstand, child abuse 
under the influence of alcohol, a rape attempt after an evening spent together, a shooting by a 
homeless person, aggressive driving leading to a serious accident, and rape and robbery with 
fatal consequences. All cases were then condensed and structured in the same way: Descrip-
tion of offender, victim and their relation followed by an account of the sequence of events, 
and finally, a statement on the harm done to the victim. After reading each case, participants 
had to answer the question if the offender’s action was premeditated or not. The sequence of 
the cases followed a fixed randomized order. 
Information amount  
As detailed above, judgments of persons with different levels of legal training should be in-
fluenced differentially by the amount of available case information. Each selected case was 
prepared in two different versions: one with less information containing 11 to 13 basic propo-
sitions (as a measure of information content) and the other with more information comprising 
20 to 24 propositions. Version 2 was exactly identical to Version 1 except for the additional 
propositions. A critical point was that these additional pieces of information were chosen 
from the original case material but followed the main objective to be not more informative 
                                        
7   German law does not use different terms for intentionality in different types of offenses. As five out of 
eight cases involve a killing we will use the term “premeditation” in the remainder of the paper although 
three cases describe non-lethal assaults. 8 
for answering the question of premeditation than the basic information. In a pre-test with par-
ticipants from the same subject pool (containing both student with and without legal training) 
investigating the relevance and validity of the propositions, we found that the basic proposi-
tions were rated significantly more relevant to the premeditation judgment than the additional 
propositions, F(1,70) = 28.7, p < .001, η
2 = .29. Moreover, the additional propositions were 
rated as being less valid cues for the judgment than basic propositions, F(1,70) = 14.9, p < 
.001, η
2 = .18. Also, this main effect was stable for both trained and untrained participants of 
the pre-test, as a non-significant interaction showed, F < 1, p > .367, verifying that any ef-
fects of information content are not due to differential validity of the additional propositions.  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly selected to receive one of the two versions (high vs. low amount 
of information). After reading each case material, participants had to decide if the offender’s 
crime was premeditated or not and indicate on an 11-point Likert scale how confident they 
were of their decision (0 = absolutely uncertain, 10 = absolutely certain). Two items were 
used to investigate participants’ emotions: Emotional arousal and the valence of the experi-
enced emotion. As all cases consisted of crimes against persons, we limited the questions to 
assess unpleasant activation (i.e., negative valence and high/low arousal). On 11-point Likert 
scales, we asked participants How strongly are you affected by this case? (0 = not at all, 10 = 
very strongly) and How negative is your emotional reaction to this case? (0 = neutral, 10 = 
very negative). As the internal consistency of these items was very high (Cronbach’s α be-
tween .72 and .89 for individual cases; overall α = .96), we pooled them into a single Emotion 
scale. To get a first impression on the mental representations of the cases, we asked partici-
pants at the end of the experiment if the cases were evocative of a specific mental picture and 




Since our research questions concern judgment accuracy, we used the verdicts of the German 
Federal Court of Justice (the highest appellate court in Germany for civil and criminal cases) 
on the question of premeditation in each of the eight cases as an external criterion for partici-
pants’ accuracy. Accurate judgments were thus operationalized as “hits” (premeditation was 
present) or correct rejections (premeditation was not present). Descriptive data on accuracy 
show that legal training resulted in more accurate judgments in general, and that this does not 
seem to depend on information amount (see Figure 1a). To test our hypotheses, we conducted 
a logistic regression predicting accuracy with legal training, amount of information, and the 9 
interaction between the two predictors. Additionally, dummy variables were included to con-
trol for case-specific variance. In this and all following regressions we corrected for clusters 
in observations due to repeated measurement and violations of homoscedasticity using 
STATA standard procedures (i.e., CLUSTER, ROBUST; Gould, Pitblado, & Sribney, 2006; 
Hayes & Cai, 2007; Rogers, 1993). Not surprisingly and in support of H1a, we found that 
legal training predicts better judgment accuracy (Table 1). In line with the descriptive data, 
the results indicate that individuals with legal training were more likely to judge a case cor-
rectly than individuals without legal training. The odds ratio indicates that the ratio of the 
odds of being correct as compared to wrong is for people with legal training 1.8 as high as for 
people without legal training. Stated differently, the marginal effect of legal training is 14%. 
However, varying the amount of information did not produce differential accuracy (H1b). We 
also did not find evidence for an interaction effect (H1c), suggesting that individuals with 
legal training did not benefit differentially from additional information compared to individu-
als without legal training.  
 
Table 1: Logistic Regression for Judgment Accuracy 
 
  Judgment  
Accuracy 
  
Amount of information   0.868 
(1=high vs. 0=low)  (-1.19) 
  
Legal training  1.800*** 
(1=yes vs. 0=no)  (4.90) 
  






Exponentiated coefficients; SEs corrected for 90 clusters in observations due to repeated  
measurement; z statistics in parentheses 
*** p < 0.001 
 10 











































































Note. Error bars indicate SEs corrected for clusters in observations due to repeated measurement.  
 
Confidence Ratings 
We expected that confidence would be influenced by legal training in that individuals with 
legal training should show higher confidence (H2a), which was descriptively supported by 
the data (Figure 1b). Confidence ratings were analyzed by linear regressions with legal train-
ing, amount of information, and the respective interaction as predictors (Table 2). We found 
support for H2a in that legal training (vs. no legal training) corresponded to higher confi-
dence in participants’ judgments. However, neither the interaction nor the main effect for 
information amount reached conventional significance levels. Thus, we did not find support 
for H2b, which suggests that individuals with legal training do not become more confident 
with increasing information. In fact, the data descriptively looks like individuals without legal 
training increase their confidence when more information is given, whereas confidence of 
individuals with legal training is somewhat less affected by varying information amounts.  11 
Table 2: Linear regression for confidence and emotional ratings 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 Confidence  Emotion  Rating 
Amount of Information 
(1=high vs. 0=low) 
0.418 -0.128 
(1.42) (-0.32) 
    




    
IE Amount*Training  -0.836  -1.475* 
(-1.40) (-1.85) 
    
Constant 7.003***  6.110*** 
 (47.59)  (30.90) 
Observations 718  718 
Adjusted R
2 0.040  0.092 
 
t statistics in parentheses; SEs corrected for 90 clusters in observations due to repeated 
measurement 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 (one-tailed), ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Emotions 
We expected that individuals with legal training would be less emotionally reactive to the 
content of the cases (H3a), that more information leads to clearer mental representations and 
stronger emotional reactions (H3b), and that this latter effect is stronger for individuals with-
out legal training. The data descriptively support all three hypotheses (Figure 1c). To test the 
hypotheses statistically, we regressed emotional ratings on legal training (yes vs. no), amount 
of information and the interaction between the two predictor variables (see Table 2). Results 
show the predicted main effect of legal training (H3a), such that individuals without legal 
training reported stronger emotional reactions to the legal cases. While we did not find sup-
port for the predicted main effect of information amount (H3a), a significant interaction sup-
ports our hypothesis in a one-sided test (H3c). Specifically, whereas individuals with legal 
training reported weaker emotional reactions with increasing amount of information, individuals 
without legal training indicated stronger emotional reactions when more information was given. 
Explorative analysis of mental representations 
To investigate the mental representations underlying confidence ratings and emotional reac-
tions, we conducted an explorative analysis of participants’ reported mental representations 
of the legal case. The qualitative data on the mental representation were coded along a mixed 
content- and theory-driven code system (cf. Miles & Huberman, 1984). Each written state-
ment on a case was analyzed for seven different codes that gathered the theme, details and 
personal involvement in the mental representation. Specifically, each statement was coded 
whether a legal term was used or not; whether it was general or specific; whether it was ex-12 
patiated upon or merely stated; whether self-involvement was stated or not; whether a refer-
ence to the offender was made or not; whether a reference to the victim was made or not; and 
– if applicable – whether a fictitious (e.g., film, TV) or a real-life situation was stated. Over-
all, 253 statements were given by the participants and coded by two independent raters. After 
rating the first 50 statements results were compared, differences discussed and the code de-
scriptions refined where necessary. In a second step, all statements were rated anew. Inter-
rater-reliability ranged from good (general or specific: Kendall’s τ = .68, 86.2% agreement) 
to very good (self-involvement: Kendall’s τ = .97, 99.6% agreement). 
Figure 2 summarizes the results for the mental models of persons with and without legal 
training. Three codes show a systematic pattern. As could be expected, legal terms are signif-
icantly more often present in the mental representation of individuals with legal training than 
in the representations of individuals without such training (Mann-Whitney U = 180.5, exact p 
< .001). Moreover, persons without legal training show a higher involvement of self (Mann-
Whitney  U = 307.5, exact p = .013) and more references to real-life situations (Mann-
Whitney U = 313.0, exact p = .050) than participants with legal training. That is, whereas 
participants with advanced legal training represent cases in more legal (abstract) terms, the 
cases seem to evoke memories of real situations and a higher personal involvement in people 
without legal training. Participants with legal training also expatiated more upon the cases 
than persons without training, however, this effect did not reach conventional significance 
level (Mann-Whitney U=337.5, exact p=.085). 
Figure 2: Differences in mental models between participants with and without legal training 
 
 
Note. Error bars indicate SEs. 13 
Discussion 
The current study was designed to investigate the effects of training and information amount 
on decision quality, confidence and emotional reactions in legal cases concerning premedita-
tion. In contrast to some findings concerning the quality of experts’ judgments and decisions 
(e.g., Shanteau, 1992), we found that persons with legal training are clearly better than per-
sons without training in judgments of premeditation. Hence, our findings are in accord with 
the majority of expertise research that shows superiority of experts over lay persons concern-
ing performance (see e.g., Sonnentag, 2000). Our data allow generalizing these effects to the 
field of law. Our next hypotheses, that more information should make it more difficult to fo-
cus on the relevant parts, resulting in degraded judgment accuracy and that this effect should 
depend on legal training, was not supported by the data. That is, a higher amount of infor-
mation in itself as well as in interaction with the level of legal training, had no influence on 
the judgment accuracy. This result might partially contradict with results on dilution effects 
(e.g., Nisbett et al., 1981; Smith, Stasson, & Hawkes, 1998). 
In line with research on (over)confidence (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2010; Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, 1977), participants with legal training were more confident in their decisions than 
participants without training. We also hypothesized that for individuals with legal training 
more information leads to higher confidence whereas the opposite effect will be observed for 
individuals without legal training. However, we did not find an interaction with the amount of 
information. 
We had also expected that individuals with legal training would be less emotionally reactive 
to the content of the legal cases, that more information would lead to stronger emotional reac-
tions driven by clearer mental representations, and that this latter effect would be stronger for 
individuals without legal training. The main effect for training and the interaction effect were 
supported by our data. The clear differences in mental representations between legally trained 
and untrained participants might account for the stronger emotional reaction of untrained per-
sons: Trained persons constructed their mental representation mainly using (abstract) legal 
concepts whereas untrained persons heavily relied on instances of comparable cases they had 
heard of before or drawing parallels to instances they experienced themselves (self-
involvement). The latter is likely to induce stronger affective reactions. Moreover, the lower 
affective reaction of trained participants seems to support the widely held belief that expert 
lawyers are less affectively influenced by the material and differ in their decision making 
from non-experts. Interestingly, we observed a differential effect of amount of information: 
Trained individuals’ emotional reaction towards a case reduced with increasing amounts of 
information, whereas the emotional arousal for untrained participants increased with more 
information. Legally trained persons seem to become even more analytic with adding further 
information whereas the opposite is the case for untrained persons. This difference might be 
due to the fact that people without legal training are not able to appropriately evaluate the 
additional information. It is also possible that, as the information amount is augmented, 14 
trained judges recruit increasingly deliberative processing techniques (i.e., comparing the 
details of the case with existing knowledge structures relevant to the legal judgment) that ab-
stract the given information to the point where the mental representation of the crime is no 
longer conducive to extreme emotional reactions.   
Overall, our findings highlight the differences in how individuals with and without legal 
training make decisions in legal cases. Trained persons construct mental representations using 
legal terms. They analyze the case, and this process likely does not generate strong affective 
reactions. As a result of their superior legal knowledge they are likely to produce better 
judgments and are more confident in their decisions. Legally trained persons become less 
aroused when they have more information to process. In contrast, due to their lack of explicit 
legal knowledge, untrained persons seem to construct their mental representations mainly on 
the basis of comparable situations they know. They produce stronger affective reactions, par-
ticularly when given more information, and their judgments are considerably worse than 
those of trained persons.  
In line with theoretical considerations (e.g., Herbig & Glöckner, 2009) and findings from ex-
pertise research (for an overview see Ericsson, Charness, Hoffman, & Feltovich, 2006) our 
results show that legal training can lead to different mental representations, differences in the 
accompanying integral emotions (Feigenson & Park, 2006), and also differences in judgment 
confidence. Moreover, for people in advanced professional training these representations 
should be better adapted to the complex reality of the domain (i.e., by containing more specif-
ic legal terms) and therefore lead to better judgments as shown in our results.  
Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
At first glance it should not be surprising that individuals without legal training did not pro-
duce the same level of judgment performance as individuals with legal training. This is obvi-
ous since law students are more similar in legal knowledge to the judges of the Federal High 
Court whose ruling was taken as the standard by which judgment accuracy was assessed. The 
difference in legal knowledge between the two groups used in this experiment is further am-
plified by the fact that participants were not provided with a legal definition of premeditation. 
The observed differences in performance, thus, may also reflect a deeper divide in the under-
standing of what premeditation means for lay judges vs. trained judges. While it is customary 
to provide legal instructions to jurors in courts, research shows that only a minority of jurors 
(31%) actually understand these instructions (Thomas, 2010). In their function as lay judges, 
they are employed to legitimize jurisdiction, make laws and legal procedures more transpar-
ent and understandable, and represent the common public in the court (e.g., Machura, 2007). 
Our results show that in absence of a clear definition of premeditation, lay people resort to 
information processing strategies that are built on different mental representations, which is 
the key element that needs to be taken into account when comparing legal judgments of 15 
trained vs. untrained judges. Nonetheless, differences in the conception of premeditation be-
tween legal scholars and the common public may create its own set of challenges for public 
policy makers, and future research should critically investigate the extent to which exogenous 
beliefs influence legal judgments (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, Chaiken, & Lutz, 2002) and whether 
jury instructions can change these beliefs. 
As untrained legal decision makers are used in various functions in different legal systems 
(Ma, 1998 e.g. jurors or lay judges), the presented results are generalizeable particularly for 
this group. However, our participants with advanced legal training are not to be confused 
with legal experts, so that the contrast between groups should be interpreted with caution. 
Nonetheless, our results show that even without extensive legal and practical experience in 
the courtroom, advanced law students already construct a different mental image and rely less 
on emotions than on legal knowledge compared to students untrained in legal matters. It is 
still possible, though, that expert or highly experienced judges show different information 
processing than participants with advanced legal training. For example, with enough experi-
ence emotional reactions to the cases might develop into valid cues for legal judgment or give 
the expert judge a type of “meta-information” (i.e., knowledge on how to select, interpret, 
and weight relevant information). These speculations will have to be tested in future research 
with more experienced participants (i.e., professional judges).  
In an effort to increase external and ecological validity over studies that employ fictional le-
gal material, we used real legal cases that were decided by the German Federal Court of Jus-
tice. This was done in order to have an external criterion allowing a judgment standard 
against which our participants’ judgments could be categorized into correct and incorrect 
judgments. However, even this external criterion is not immune to criticism. Judgments of the 
German Federal Court of Justice are not waterproof; actually, the simple fact that a case ends 
up in this highest German appellate court means that it went through courts at lower levels 
and is potentially ambiguous. Furthermore, rulings of the Federal Court of Justice are often 
hotly contested in legal academia. Nevertheless, the use of an external criterion for evaluating 
performance is important in researching consequences of training. It might be difficult to find 
specific criteria of judgment and decision quality in the legal domain in general (e.g., quality 
of legal argumentation, consistent use of legal theory etc.). However, we feel that our 
straightforward approach allows for a better insight into differences between legally trained 
and untrained persons. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Our research is a step towards understanding legal judgment and decision making on differ-
ent levels of expertise. Practical recommendations on public policy related to legal proce-
dures need to take into account that laypersons and people with advanced legal training deal 
quite differently with legal information. Therefore, legal procedures should differ depending 16 
on whether judgment rulings are made by jurors, lay judges, magistrates or professional judges. 
One important issue that policy makers need to resolve is whether lay judges should be given 
the same (and same amount) of information typically provided to professional judges. In the 
German court system, lay judges are usually provided with a synopsis of the evidence, 
whereas their professional colleagues have full access to the incriminating case material. 
While our data do not necessarily support the conclusion that lay judges are worse at han-
dling more information, they do show that mental images and emotional reactions are sensi-
tive to the amount of information provided. Given the propensity of untrained judges and ju-
rors to have stronger emotional reactions to the case information, it seems questionable 
whether providing more information always leads to better (and unbiased) legal decisions.  
In cases where laws are an instantiation of and based on the values of the common public, it 
is likely that representative yet untrained judges are quite similar in their legal judgments to 
their professional counterparts. Here a violation of commonly held beliefs and values may 
lead to an emotional reaction that is in line with the jurisdiction (i.e., a heinous crime is pun-
ished accordingly), thereby strengthening the link between emotions and legal decision mak-
ing. However, there are also cases in which the intricacies of the law run counter to the gen-
eral conception of fairness and justice, and the mental representation of the crime differs 
sharply for trained vs. untrained judges. In these cases it might be better to avoid providing 
lay judges with an abundance of case information. 
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Appendix: Case ‘A landlord causing a gas explosion’ 
 
Version 1 – low information amount: 
A is the owner of a block of flats that are rented. He wishes to renovate the building. The ten-
ants resist his plans. This is why A and one of his friends get the idea of manipulating a gas main in the 
cellar in order for the tenants to leave out of fear. A acts upon his plan. A realizes that the gas explosion 
could lead to the death of the inhabitants. This outcome was not intended by A.  
There is an explosion, the entire house collapses, six inhabitants are killed. 
 
Version 2 – high information amount: 
A is the owner of a block of flats that are rented. He wishes to renovate the building in order to 
sell it at a profit. The tenants resist his plans by refusing to move into a different apartment block that is 
also owned by him. A has therefore put his tenant under pressure in order to induce them to move out. He 
is unsuccessful. This is why A and one of his friends get the idea of manipulating a gas main in the cellar 
in order to cause an explosion, with the aid of a nightlight. They want to cause “the walls to shake”, to 
“officially evacuate” the house or to induce tenants to leave out of fear. A acts upon his plan by removing 
plugs from the gas main. A realizes that the gas explosion could lead to the death of the inhabitants. This 
outcome was not intended by A.  
There is an explosion, the entire house collapses, six inhabitants are killed. 
 
Note. Underlines indicate the additional information. 
 
 